B Project Status Overview
This report describes the results of our research for the second quarter of the project, October 1998 to January 1999. During the first quarter, we have implemented a modified ANTS toolkit with explicit NodeOS and Execution Environment (EE) objects, to act as a testing ground for our security architecture. The Cherubim project has been successfully integrated into ANTS to provide a framework for exploring and experimenting with various design alternatives. In this quarter our main focus was to port our secure ANTS implementation (SAINTS) onto the Abone, and extend our policy framework to support role based access control (RBAC). We have interacted with SRI extensively for the porting, to make sure we compy with the current implementation of Anetd. We also provided useful feedback to the Anetd project.
We have extended our policy framework to include Role Based Access Control (RBAC) . A Role Based Access Control policy, as the name suggests, uses the concept of a role as its basis for representing permissions. A role is chiefly a semantic construct that forms the basis of access control policy. With RBAC, system administrators create roles according to the job functions performed in an organization, grant permissions to those roles, and then assign users to the roles on the basis of their specific job responsibilities and qualifications. The idea is that the particular combination users and permissions brought together by a role tends to change over time, while the permissions associated with a role are themselves relatively more stable.
We have tried to make the RBAC policy as general as possible. It provides support for session, role hierarchy, and constraints. The constraints include mutually exclusive roles/permissions, prerequisite roles/permissions, and cardinality constraints. In addition to originally supported DAC, DDAC and MAC, the policy framework is flexible for different applications.
We are also implementing a simplified Cherubim style reference monitor to interact with the latest version of the NodeOS, and investigating novel active applications to demonstrate our SAINTS and RBAC policy framework. We also plan to replace the ORB based reference monitor with a simple implementation in C++. We plan to accomplish these tasks in the next quarter.
C SAINTS Overview
In the previous quarter, we split original ANTS Node into a NodeOS and an Execution Environment (EE). The Cherubim project was integrated into the layer separating the NodeOS and the EE to provide the required security interface, preserving backward compatibility. Figure 1 is a schematic representation of our preliminary security architecture, which we call SAINTS (Secure Active Interoperable Network Toolkit System).
When our modified ANTS runtime starts up, it instantiates a single NodeOS object corresponding to a node's operating system, one Channel object for each local network interface, one Management Execution Environment (EE) and one GUI object for the node. The NodeOS and the Management EE are persistent. The NodeOS starts up customized Execution Environments (EEs) (eg., ANTS, PLAN etc.), which are also persistent, to handle the processing and forwarding of application capsules. These capsules are forwarded via the local node, which transmits them as packets using the link layer services of the local channel.
The following changes were made to ANTS to integrate Cherubim into ANTS:
• Specify a clear interface for the NodeOS and convert it into a CORBA server With these changes in place, the modified ANTS system was deployed. We have studied the completed version with different policy specifications. We have tested it with one application, namely Ping and Anti-Ping (Gnipper).
D Implementation Details

D.1 Porting SAINTS onto Abone
We have successfully ported SAINTS onto the Abone for the community to use. At the first glance it seems straightforward to port SAINTS onto Abone. However, since the source code of Anetd of SRI is not publicly available, some extra effort is needed to do the porting. We interact intensively with SRI to understand and help correct the current implementation of Anetd. The three main issues were:
• Anetd uses Java RMI to invoke remote java classes, and can have only one code base. It doesn't provide any way to specify classpath. We need to make SAINTS into a flat directory, extract the contents of all JAR archives, so that RMI can find the correct classes.
• Anetd uses JDK115 Green thread, and SAINTS uses JDK116 Native thread. The two JDKs are not compatible with each other. This is a very time consuming procedure to figure out the problem and fix it.
• Anetd uses the standard input to communicate with the ANTS/SAINTS EE, so the input to GUI of ANTS/SAINTS is disabled. We reconstruct SAINTS to have EE and application GUI on separate JVM so that applications can use GUI for user input. We define the necessary interface between EE and applications. We use Java RMI model for the communications between application GUI and EE.
We have set up three Solaris machines on the Abone, and made our SAINTS source code available through our web server.
D.2 Multicast Applications for Composability Activities with Team 4
We have integrated the original ANTS multicast application, which uses Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM), into our SAINTS. Now our system can support secure, flexible, and dynamic multicasting, running on top of our SAINTS EE. We are planning to collaborate with other research groups of Team 4 to implement a composable, secure, flexible, and reliable active multicast service. We are looking at the CANES project of Georgia Tech. and the PANAMA project of TASC and University of Massachusetts, in particular and plan to develop a strategy for integration by the April demo.
D.3 Role Based Access Control (RBAC) Policy
D.3.1 Introduction
The biggest advantage that RBAC has over other forms of access control is that it is extremely intuitive to use and maps easily to real-world situations. A hierarchy of roles with senior roles inheriting all the permissions of junior roles closely follows the structure of organizations. The access control policy in RBAC is embodied in components such as role-permission, user-role and role-role relationships. These components collectively determine whether a particular user is allowed access to a particular operation on a particular component. These individual components can be easily (and intuitively) configured to provide the required degree of access control. For example, adding a new user to a system would merely involve assigning appropriate roles to the user according to his/her functions in the organization. Likewise, changing the nature of (say) printer access for all managers in an organization can be accomplished by merely changing the permissions with the manager role in the organization. All managers should immediately see the effects of the change. Figure 2 shows the detailed representation of the entire RBAC implementation package. It should be mentioned at this point that for a complete policy class hierarchy and notations one should refer [10] . Any component whose parent class is not explicitly indicated inherits from the PolicyRepresentationObject class in [10] directly. The figure here is to show the overview, and focus should be on interfaces RBAC package provides, which is discussed later.
RBAC supports session concept. A session is an activation that maps one user to possible subset of the roles the user belongs to. In the implementation the Session object encapsulates the concept of a session in an RBAC policy. We refer to Figure 3 for a representation of the Session class in the RBAC package. An instance of the Session class contains an instance of User and one of PermissionsMapping. The User instance is the user for whom the Session instance has been created. The PermissionsMapping instance contains all the permissions that the user may be granted in that session. Typically a User would request a Session instance comprising the permissions corresponding to a subset of the Roles he/she has been assigned to in the system. The Session class exports an Evaluate() method that evaluates the policy represented by the Session instance.
D.3.3 Editing the RBAC Policy
The RBAC policy class requires a high level of sophistication when making changes to the policy. This is because of the existence of constraints that govern the process of assigning permissions and Users to Roles. The UserRolesAssignment and RolePermissionsAssignment classes export methods that should be used to add and remove Users and permissions to the RBAC policy. This section takes a look at the interfaces of these two classes. Figure 4 is a listing of the UserRolesAssignment class' interface. The CreateUserEntry() method creates a new entry (an empty RoleSet) corresponding to the input UserSet. The RemoveUsersEntry() method removes the entry corresponding to the input UserSet. The AddRoles() method adds all the Roles in the input RoleSet to the set of Roles that the input UserSet maps to. In doing so, the method first checks to make sure that no constraints are violated. The RemoveRoles method that takes just a RoleSet input removes all occurrences of the Roles in the RoleSet from the UserRolesAssignment object. The second RemoveRoles method removes all occurrences of the Roles in the input RoleSet from the RoleSet corresponding to the input UserSet. The GetRoles() method returns a RoleSet containing all the Roles to which the input User belongs to.
The other methods in the UserRolesAssignment class' interface pertain to the addition and removal of constraints from the UserAssignmentConstraints object. AddPrereqConstraint() and AddMutexConstraint() add constraints of the prerequisite and mutually exclusive types respectively. Their inputs consist of two RoleSets whose elements represent the constraint. The RemovePrereqConstraint() and RemoveMutexConstraint() methods remove constraints of the corresponding kinds. The AddCardinalityConstraint() method sets a cardinality limit on the number of Users that The remainder of the methods pertain to the addition and removal of constraints from the RolePermissionsAssignment object. The AddPrereqConstraint() and AddMutexConstraint() methods add constraints of the prerequisite and mutually exclusive types respectively. The constraints contain two SystemObject-OperationSet pairs and these are provided as inputs to the methods. The RemovePrereqConstraint() and RemoveMutexConstraint() methods remove constraints of the corresponding types.
D.3.4 Evaluating the RBAC policy
Evaluating an RBAC policy involves generating an instance of the Session class (see figure 3 ) and evaluating the policy corresponding to this object. Thus the actual work of an evaluation occurs in the Session instance that is generated. When the Evaluate() method of a GenericRBACPolicy instance is invoked with a DataInOut parameter, the User and SystemObject attributes of the DataInOut parameter are first extracted. A session corresponding to all the Roles of this User is generated and the Evaluate() method of the Session instance invoked with the DataInOut object as parameter.
The Evaluate() method in the Session object first checks to make sure that the User attribute of the object matches the User for whom the policy is being evaluated. It then looks in its PermissionsMapping component for an entry that matches the input SystemObject and input Operation (DataInOut.rbacoperation). If such an entry exists, the corresponding pre-mechanisms and post-mechanisms are obtained. The pre-mechanisms are all invoked first. If any of them returns false, the Evaluate() method returns false. If they all return true, the Evaluate() method returns true, adding all the post-mechanisms to the appropriate field in the DataInOut object for evaluation later.
E.1 Abone Policy Framework
It is planned to have 1000 active nodes for the Abone testbed. We believe such a testbed will need a policy framework to control its activities. Additionally, such a policy framework for Abone will provide a prototype for the future active network research. There is no discussion on policy in the latest Abone proposal. The only mention is QCM from UPenn which is used to manage key database.
Our goal is to have a practical and theoretically-sound policy framework for the Abone which the AN community can use. We plan to extend and modify our currently available policy framework to achieve this goal. Our current policy framework is centralized, using a GUI for modifications. It is not suitable for the current Abone.
The main implementation problems we are trying to solve include:
• Modify current policy framework so that it works on the Abone. We need to have meta-level policy and some bootstrapping protocols, and support modifications through active capabilities in the capsules. This part will need some support from management EE.
• Design and use role-based model to support separation of duty. There are variations of separation of duty, due to constraints on role membership, constraints on role activation, and/or constraints on role usage.
• Support domain concept and provide domain policy conflict resolution and negotiation. A security domain is the scope of a particular policy. There may be several types of domains relevant to security: 1) Security policy domainthe scope over which a security policy is enforced; subdomains for different aspects of this policy are possible. 2) Security environment domain -the scope over which the enforcement of a policy may be achieved by some means local to that environment. 3) Security technology domain -where common security mechanisms are used to enforce the polices.
In the theoretical part, we plan to use current research results in the following areas:
• Verify separation of duty requirements, even in delegation systems.
• Verify some important protocols using finite state machine and/or temporal logic.
We plan to demonstrate the flexibility and usefulness of this policy framework in some novel active applications discussed in next section.
We don't intend to make policy framework complete for all possible application scenarios, but it should be self-contained, as general as possible, and easily extensible. Also our work does not include key management (which may be handled by QCM from UPenn).
E.2 Novel Applications
We are still searching for some novel application to demonstrate the usefulness of our policy framework and active networks. We plan to implement a discovery protocol using the multicasting and broadcasting capability of ANTS. We intend to show policy framework is flexible and powerful enough to handle complicated domains, role interactions, and policy type changes (such as from DAC to MAC, or DAC/MAC to RBAC).
E.3 Reference Monitor (RM)
Various ways to improve our SAINTS are also explored in our discussion. We plan to implement a much leaner reference monitor to replace the ORB-based one in use. The reference monitor should be able to integrate our policy framework, EE, NodeOS seamlessly. We are defining the interface between RM and NodeOS, and the interface between RM and our policy framework. We are currently looking at Scout from Larry Peterson's group as a possible candidate for the NodeOS and we plan to implement our Reference Monitor to use it's interface. However our reference monitor will be general enough to adapt to any NodeOS implementation with a well defined interface.
E.4 Composability and Team 4 Collaborations
We plan to integrate our system with the other group members of Team 4 to support secure, composable, reliable, and flexible multicast services. We are currently examining the CANES project and the PANAMA project systems to determine appropriate interfaces between Seraphim and those systems. We plan to introduce our reference monitor into those systems so that our security system can be used to provide secure CANES-based multicast services. Our security applications include dynamic security policies that allow the user to block or receive particular multicast transmissions on a time dependent basis. We also plan to use the formal specification and verification techniques supported by MAUDE of SRI, to validate essential security protocols and policy framework components. A longer term goal is to parallel the system composability aspects introduced in CANES and PANAMA and to implement the concepts discussed by Denker [14] .
